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Durrant: Wyoming Hunt Interference Law - Anarchy in the Woods: How Far Afi

COMMENT
WYOMING'S HUNT INTERFERENCE LAW-ANARCHY IN
THE WOODS: HOW FAR AFIELD DOES THE RIGHT OF
FREE SPEECH EXTEND?
Each year thousands of Americans enjoy the natural beauty of our
national forests and wild lands and at the same time help control populations of wildlife by hunting. What began as a few isolated incidents of
hunt interference in the eastern states has spread across the country.
Hunters are being followed into the fields and forests by animal rights
activists.' These anti-hunting advocates use air horns, loud music, and2
other abusive tactics to interfere with legal hunting and fishing activities.
Even more alarming is that vandalism and physical violence are becoming
more common. 3
1. Extremist animal rights groups condemn all use of animals by humans. They
call it animal exploitation. Tom Regan, a recognized and published advocate of total
animal rights has stated the following goals of the movement:
* the total abolition of the use of animals in science;
* the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture;
" the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping.
TOM REGAN, THE STRUGGLE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 46-47 (1987) [hereinafter REGAN, THE
STRUGGLE].

2. Pheasant hunters in Duvall, Washington were joined in the field by animal
rights activists who "ran shouting, clapping and making as much noise and commotion
as possible across the wet ground in front of the hunters." Dee Norton, Fussing Over
Pheasants,SEArrLE TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at B1.
Hunt interference tactics have not escaped even the President of the United
States. Demonstrators from the Fund for Animals protested President Bush as he participated in his annual quail hunt during his Christmas vacation. Luckily, the President has secret service personnel to keep the protestors at a distance. Animal Lovers
to Protest Bush Hunting Vacation, ARIZ. REPUBLIc, Dec. 25, 1991, at A6. Even though
the animal activists had no success in dissuading President Bush from his hunt, they
did, however, succeed in propagandizing their efforts by attracting media coverage.
3. In West Yellowstone, an activist protesting a buffalo hunt dipped her hands in
the blood of a downed bison, smeared the blood on a hunter's face, and followed up
her deed with a verbal assault. On the Grapevine, WYO. WILDLIFE, June 1990, at 39.
Eleven protestors representing the Fund for Animals used snowmobiles and cross
country skis to position themselves between hunters and their game. Id. Another Montana sportsman was struck twice by a protestor with a ski pole and then struck a third
blow to the kidney as he turned to ignore his assailant. Id. The State of Montana had
approved the bison hunt because these buffalo that had migrated from the Yellowstone Park carried brucellosis, a disease transmittable to domestic cattle that causes
the cattle to abort their young. Id. See also Activists Try to Block Hunt Near Park,
CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, Mar. 14, 1990, at 1. In Connecticut, a hunter fractured his neck
after an animal rights activist sawed through the struts of his tree stand. 137 CONG.
REc. S7464-03 (daily ed. June 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Stanford for himself, Sen.
Breaux, Sen. Cochran, and Sen. Hatch). Members of a New Jersey wing shooting club
found that the tires on eight of their vehicles had been destroyed by spikes and roofing
nails planted by anti-hunting activists. Id. Their dogs were caught in a number of leg
crippling traps set in protest of the hunt. Id.
Extremist animal rights organizations also distribute pamphlets on other equally
provocative ways to disrupt a hunt. Tactics suggested include the following: apply for
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State legislatures are concerned that as animal rights extremists and
anti-hunting groups grow and become better organized their tactics will
become more extreme and confrontations between activists and hunters
will occur with increased violence and frequency." To address the problem of hunt interference, forty-five states,6 including Wyoming, have
passed hunt interference legislation.6 These laws have been dubbed as

permits, thus denying them to hunters; harass and disturb wildlife by using dogs, loud
noises, etc.; tear down blinds and tree stands or desecrate them with rotten eggs, cow
dung, human urine or fecal matter; organize groups to go into the woods during hunting season to disrupt the hunt. On the Grapevine, WYO. WILDLIFE, Mar. 1991, at 39.
See also FRIENDS OF ANIMALS, INc., TIPs FOR HUNT SABOTEURS; INGRID NEWKIRK, SAVE
THE ANIMALS 101 EASY THINGS YOU CAN Do (1990); FRIENDS OF ANIMALS, INC.,
SABOTAGING THE HUNTING CROWD, ACTIONLINE (1988); STEVE RUGGERI, FRIENDS OF ANIMALS, INC., RHODE ISLAND HUNTER HARASSMENT CHALLENGE, NEW ENGLAND NEWSLETTER, Nov.-Dec., 1985, at 1-2. Luke A. Dommer, The Anatomy of Hunt Sabotage, THE

1990, at 70.
4. Such fears are not unfounded. Civil disobedience, albeit criminal activity, is

ANIMALS' VOICE MAG., Aug.

common and even encouraged in order to deliver the animal rights message. REGAN,

supra note 1, at 174-83. For activists who participate in such activities,
the ends justify all means. Tom Regan, an animal rights activist, declared that the
THE STRUGGLE,

animal rights movement is a war and disregard for the law by civil disobedience is
their main and most powerful weapon. Id. at 175-76.
5. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.790 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-316 (1984); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-71-228 (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2009 (West
Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-6-115.5 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
53a-183a (West Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 731 (Supp. 1990); FLORIDA §
372.705 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-151 (Michie 1986); IDAHO CODE § 361510 (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 61, 11302 (Smith-Hurd 1989); IND. CODE ANN. §
14-2-11-2 (Burns 1990); Act of June 4, 1991, H.F. 109, 1991 Iowa Legis. Serv., available
in WESTLAW (to be codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 109.125); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 321014 (Supp. 1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150.710 (Michie Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT.

§ 56:648.1 (West 1987); Act of Dec. 19, 1991, Ch. 364, 1991 Mass. Legis. Serv.,
available in WESTLAW; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7541 (West Supp. 1990); MD.
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 10-422 (1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 300.262a (West Supp.
1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97A.037 (West Supp. 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-7-147
(Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN STAT. § 578.151 (Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. COnE ANN. § 87-3141 to 144 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.015 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 207:57 (Supp. 1990); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0110 (McKinney Supp. 1991);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-295 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-31 (1991); Act of Oct. 23,
ANN.

1991, File 60, Ohio Legis. Serv., available in WESTLAW (to be codified at OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1533.03); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 5-212 (West 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §
496.994 (Supp. 1990); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit 34, § 2302 (1991); RI. GEN. LAWS § 2013-16 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 50-1-137 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 41-1-8 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-4-302 (1987); TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE
ANN. § 62.0125 (West 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-20-29 (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 4708 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-521.1 (Michie Supp. 1991); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 77.16.340 (West Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 20-2-2a (1989); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 29.223 (West Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 23-3-405 (1991).

6. Senator Wyche Fowler, Jr., D-Georgia, has introduced federal legislation in the
Senate that would also prohibit interference with a lawful hunt in the national forests.
S. 1294, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1991). Representative Ron Marlenee, R-Montana,

introduced the equivalent in the House of Representatives. 137

CONG. REC.

E79-01

(daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991). This federal proposal is currently in committee and is pending.

The Congressional Research Service performed a constitutional analysis of the federal
proposal and found it to be constitutional on its face. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE SPORT HUNTING SAFETY AND PRESERVATION ACT OF 1991: CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF H.R. 371, 102D CONGRESS (1991 predistribution copy).
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"hunter harassment" or "hunter protection" laws. 7 Such legislation commonly prohibits the obstruction, impediment, or interference of a lawful
hunt, whether such interference is perpetrated by animal rights activists
or other hunters.
However, certain animal rights groups that oppose hunting have been
especially unreceptive to these laws. They claim that hunt interference
laws restrict the activities they employ to fight for animal rights, thus
violating their right to free speech. In some instances, such activists intentionally break hunt interference laws in order to get arrested and subsequently challenge the constitutionality of such laws in court., In
Dorman v. Satti,9 a federal court found that Connecticut's hunt interference statute, as written, was vague and overbroad, and thus
unconstitutional.
This comment discusses the constitutionality of hunt interference
laws.' 0 Specifically, it will examine the Wyoming hunt interference law,
and concludes that the Wyoming statute does not infringe upon the First
Amendment right of free speech by illustrating first, that the Wyoming
statute is neither vague nor overbroad, and second, by conducting a First
Amendment analysis, that the Wyoming hunt interference statute complies with free speech safeguards.
7. These terms are misnomers. These statutes protect hunters and activists alike
by ensuring their safety. They also protect states' interests, including wildlife management. For convenience in referring to these laws, the term "hunt interference" laws/
statutes will be used.
8. In a recent Montana case, a federal court of appeals dismissed a challenge to
Montana's hunt interference law. Lilburn v. Racicot, 8 Mont. Fed. Rep. 463 (D. Mont.
Jan. 22, 1991). Plaintiff, Lilburn, an animal rights activist, was charged under Montana's hunt interference law for interfering with an individual engaged in the lawful
taking of a game animal. Id. The complaint stated that the activist intended to interfere or stop a lawful activity by placing himself between a buffalo and a hunter, who
was aiming a loaded rifle at the buffalo. Id. at 464, 468. Plaintiff sued to have the hunt
interference law declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it was vague and that
the law violated his First Amendment right of free speech. Id. Because of the constitutional nature of the issues, plaintiff sought his remedies in the federal district court.
The court dismissed the suit by stating that the state courts would adequately protect
his constitutional rights and that he must first exhaust his remedies there. Id. at 468.
In dismissing the suit, Federal Judge Charles C. Lovell issued an opinion that the
Montana hunt interference statute was constitutional. Id. at 468-70. The court held
that hunting is a lawful and legitimate activity "which the state may protect in any
reasonable and constitutionally permissible manner." Id. at 468. The court noted that
the law protected both activist and hunters alike from the very harm that occurred or
that may have resulted in this instance. Id. Judge Lovell held that the Montana statute was not vague because it proscribed behavior "which interferes with an individual
actually engaged in the lawful taking of a wild animal." Id. at 469-70. The court further disagreed that the hunt interference law infringed upon the activist's right of free
speech by stating that the limitation on speech was incidental to the state's regulation
of a subject within its power to regulate. Id. at 468-69.
9. 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
10. The term "hunting" is used throughout this comment. However, this is not
meant to exclude other types of lawful taking processes, such as fishing. Many state
hunt interference statutes prohibit interference with the lawful taking (hunting, fishing, or trapping) of wildlife. Because fishing is the taking of wildlife, this means that
intentional interference with the taking of a game fish is also prohibited under such
statutes. Wyoming's statute specifically includes such a prohibition. Wvo. STAT. § 23-3405(a) (1991).
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BACKGROUND

Because hunt interference laws may outlaw the extreme interference tactics utilized by certain animal rights groups, statutes such as
Wyoming's hunt interference law may be challenged in court. The
only successful challenge to a hunt interference statute to date occurred in Dorman v. Satti," where a federal court found a Connecticut statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Further, animal
rights activists assert that protests that interfere with the ,lawful taking of wildlife are protected under the First Amendment and that
hunt interference laws inhibit the exercise of free speech and are
therefore unconstitutional.12
In order to assess the relative merits of such claims, some background on vagueness, overbreadth, and basic free speech analysis is
necessary. First, this section discusses the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines and examines how these doctrines were applied in Dorman
to find the Connecticut hunt interference statute unconstitutional.
Second, this section reviews United States Supreme Court holdings
regarding First Amendment analysis.
The Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrines
When the federal or state governments implement laws to regulate speech, the government must be concerned with vagueness and
overbreadth. The principles of vagueness in statutes regulating speech
activities are based upon the same rationale as the overbreadth doctrine and the Supreme Court often speaks of them interchangeably."1
The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are important because legislative failure to consider these doctrines often results in unconstitutional statutes.
Briefly stated, the vagueness doctrine requires a law to place the
ordinary person on notice that certain activity is prohibited. An overbroad statute is one that is designed to prohibit activities which are
not constitutionally protected, but which is not sufficiently tailored to
exclude from its scope activities which are constitutionally protected.' 4 Concerns about imaginative minds construing practically any
regulation in a manner reflecting some minute degree of overbreadth
motivated the United States Supreme Court to limit the overbreadth
doctrine by requiring that overbreadth of a statute be substantial

11.
12.
13.
1991).
14.

862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988).
Id. at 434.
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 950 (4th ed.
Hill v. City of Houston, 764 F.2d 1156, 1161 (5th Cir. 1985).
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before it can be invalidated.15 The principles of vagueness and overbreadth become evident in Grayned v. City of Rockford. 6
The Appellant in Grayned was convicted for violating an antinoise ordinance by his participation in a 200 person demonstration in
front of an Illinois high school.' 7 The demonstrators repeatedly
cheered, chanted, baited policemen, and otherwise disrupted school
activities. 8 Appellant claimed that the ordinance was unconstitutional
because the ordinance was vague and overbroad.
The Grayned Court addressed the vagueness issue first. The
Court noted that vagueness is a basic principle of due process and
that a law is void for vagueness if a statute does not meet certain
requisites. 9 First, laws must give a person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable warning that a certain activity is prohibited. Vague laws
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning." The Court held
that the Rockford ordinance gave reasonable notice as to what conduct was prohibited and that Grayned knew that his disruptive conduct violated the ordinance. Second, in order to avoid arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, laws must provide explicit standards for
those who enforce them.2 In this instance, the behavior of the defendant disrupted school activities, which is what the Rockford ordinance
was designed to prevent. Conduct that disrupts school activities is an
explicit standard easily identified by law enforcement officers. Third,
terms of a statute should be of common understanding or clearly defined.22 Laws that do not meet these requisites are vague and impose a
chilling effect upon protected behavior.2 3 The Court held that the
terms of the statute were terms of common understanding.24 Applying
these standards, the Grayned majority held that the antinoise ordi-

15. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), the Court ruled that the overbreadth of a statute must be real and substantial in order to invoke the doctrine, especially where speech is joined with conduct. The Oklahoma statute being considered
was not overbroad based upon an unlikely interpretation and application or because
the challenger has thought of a remote instance of overbreadth. Id. at 615. Thus the
doctrine of "substantial overbreadth" was born. The standard envisioned by the Court
is rigorous, especially where conduct and speech are involved. Id. The specific test that
the Court offered is that it would invalidate statutes for overbreadth "only when the
flaw is a substantial concern in the context of the statute as a whole." Id. at 616 n.14.
16. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
17. Id. at 105. Appellant was convicted of violating an antinoise ordinance that
read, in pertinent part, as follows:
[N]o person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in which
a school or any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in the
making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or
good order of such school session or class thereof...

1d. at 107-08 (citing
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

CODE

OF ORDINANCES,

ch. 28, § 19, 2(a)).

Id. at 105.
Id. at 108.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 109.

Id.
Id. at 112.
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nance was not unconstitutionally vague.2 5
The Grayned Court next addressed overbreadth. Under the overbreadth analysis, the issue is whether the ordinance sweeps within its
prohibitions activity that is constitutionally protected.2 8 To be a constitutional regulation of speech, statutes must be narrowly tailored to
achieve a specified governmental interest. 27 In Grayned, the ordinance's purpose was clear, to ensure uninterrupted school activity.
The Court noted that expressive activity may be prohibited by law
where such expression disrupts normal school activities. In so doing,
the regulation may not punish the content of the speech, but only
expression disruptive to the forum.2 8 Noting the regulation did not
restrict expression which did not disrupt school activities and that the
ordinance was narrowly tailored to further the City's interest in having uninterrupted school sessions, the Court held that the ordinance
did not unnecessarily interfere with First Amendment rights. While
some noisy demonstrations were prohibited under the ordinance (that
might otherwise be constitutionally protected at another time and
place), Rockford's modest restriction on some expression represented
a "considered and specific legislative judgment that some kinds of expressive activity should be restricted at a particular time and
place. . .

."30

Hunt Interference Statutes and Vagueness and Overbreadth
In Dorman v. Satti,3 I a federal court of appeals struck down Connecticut's hunt interference law as a violation of the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines.32 The plaintiff, Francelle Dorman, attempted
to dissuade sportsmen from their plans to hunt waterfowl on state

25. Id. Regarding the exactness of words in a statute, the Grayned majority said
that we should never expect mathematical certainty from language and asserted that
the words of the Rockford statute are "marked by flexibility and reasonable breadth,
rather than meticulous specificity." Id. at 110 (citing Esteban v. Central Mo. State
College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969)).
26. Id. at 114.
27. Id. at 116-17. If the legislative purpose is a legitimate one of substantial governmental interest, "that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth
of the legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
28. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 119.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 121.
31. 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988).
32. This statute provided:
No person shall: (1) Interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife by another person,
or acts in preparation for such taking, with intent to prevent such taking; or (2)
harass another person who is engaged in the lawful taking of wildlife or acts in
preparation for such taking.
Id. at 433 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183a (1985)). The terms found overbroad were
italicized by the court. Id. at 433.
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forest property near her home. 33 Dorman's attempt to discourage the
hunters was consistent with her beliefs that animals have rights and
that hunting is wrong.3" After listening to Dorman's lecture, the
hunters asked her to leave. When she refused, they summoned a law
enforcement officer who arrested her for violating the hunt interference law.35
Though the charges were later dropped, Dorman sued to prohibit
enforcement of the statute on the basis that the statute violated the
doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth.3 a The State of Connecticut
argued that the statute should have been construed to proscribe physical interference and "fighting" words, which are a form of speech directed to producing imminent
violence and, therefore, not protected
3 7
by the First Amendment.
The court was not persuaded. It found that the statutory phrase
"acts in preparation" was not a reasonable time or place restriction
because "acts in preparation" could take place anywhere, not at some
specific time and place. The court's holding stemmed from the fact
that the phrase "acts in preparation" was not defined in the statute.
Thus the statute prohibited interference with a wide range of activities, such as purchasing supplies.3 ' The court also noted that the term
"harassment" was not defined as to the nature of interference proscribed by the statute. The court therefore struck down the statute
because the standards for enforcement were vague and the warning
that certain behavior would be criminal was substantially overbroad. 39
As a result of Dorman, the Connecticut legislature passed new
hunt interference legislation using clear and concise terms in order to
avoid problems of vagueness and overbreadth.4 ° It is no longer classi33. Id. at 434.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 435 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).

38. Id. at 437.
39. Id.
40. CON. GEN. STAT.

ANN. § 53a-183a (West Supp. 1991). The current statute reads
as follows:
§ 53a-183a. Obstructing or interfering with the lawful taking of wildlife: Class C
misdemeanor.
(a) No person shall obstruct or interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife by another person at the location where the activity is taking place with
intent to prevent such taking.
(b) A person violates this section when he intentionally or knowingly:
(1) Drives or disturbs wildlife for the purpose of disrupting the lawful taking of wildlife where another person is engaged in the process of lawfully
taking wildlife; (2) blocks, impedes or otherwise harasses another person
who is engaged in the process of lawfully taking wildlife; (3) uses natural or
artificial visual, aural, olfactory or physical stimuli to affect wildlife behavior in order to hinder or prevent the lawful taking of wildlife; (4) erects
barriers with the intent to deny ingress or egress to areas where the lawful
taking of wildlife may occur; (5) interjects himself into the line of fire; (6)
affects the condition or placement of personal or public property intended
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fled as a hunter protection law because the statute now focuses on
protecting the legal activity. The heading was changed from "harassment of hunters, trappers and fishermen" to "obstructing or interfering with the lawful taking of wildlife.""' The Connecticut legislature
deleted the term "acts in preparation" from the current statute. The
terms "harass" and "interfere" are now defined by examples and association with certain prohibited kinds of behavior."2
First Amendment Background
The First Amendment appears to speak in absolute terms: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . .. ."
However, "the First Amendment is not the guardian of unregulated
talkativeness. 4' 3 In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,44 the
United States Supreme Court developed a balancing test of the governmental interest and the restriction of speech involved. Justice
Harlan, in his now famous opinion for the majority, rejected the idea
that freedom of speech is absolute."' Harlan said that the Court had
consistently recognized at least two ways in which the freedom of
speech is narrower than an unlimited license of expression." First,
certain forms of expression, such as obscenity and fighting words, are
considered outside the scope of constitutional protection.4 Second, a
weighing of the governmental interests involved may allow content
neutral regulation of speech and thereby limit unfettered exercise of
speech.4 The weighing of

for use in the lawful taking of wildlife in order to impair its usefulness or
prevent its use; or (7) enters or remains upon private lands without the
permission of the owner or his agent, with intent to violate this section.
(c) For the purposes of this section, "taking" and "wildlife" shall be
defined as in section 26-1.
(d) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty
of a class C misdemeanor.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
MENT 25 (1948).

FREE SPEECH AND

ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERN-

44. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
45. Id. at 49-51.
46. Id. at 49-50. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have expanded these two ways
to include additional levels of scrutiny and analyses of the forum where speech occurs.
47. Id. at 50. Some speech is not protected at all under the First Amendment.
Fighting words, obscenity, and speech that falls under the "clear and present danger
doctrine" are examples of speech that have not been protected under Supreme Court
free speech analysis. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (for
cases involving fighting words). See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Jenkins
v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); (for cases involving restrictions of obscene
speech). See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Whitney V. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); (for cases concerning the
regulation of speech based upon the "clear and present danger" doctrine).
48. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 50-51.
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the governmental interest analysis referred to by Justice Harlan takes
the form of time, manner, and place restrictions on speech. The following section will address the background of reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions of speech.
Time, Manner, and Place Restrictions on Speech
Generally, the Supreme Court has used two analyses to determine
whether a government regulation is a reasonable time, manner, or
place restriction of speech. First, the Court has looked to see whether
the regulation is based upon the content of the speech or whether the
regulation is content-neutral. The level of judicial scrutiny applied depends upon this threshold inquiry. If the regulation restricts speech
because of its content, the level of scrutiny is almost always strict. A
law that regulates speech because of content, regardless of time, manner, and place restrictions, must be supported by a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. On
the other hand, if the regulation restricts speech on a content-neutral
basis, the level of scrutiny is lowered. A content-neutral-based regulation of speech must be supported by a substantial governmental interest, be narrowly tailored, and leave open alternative channels of
communication.
Second, where the regulation places a restriction on speech that
occurs on public property, the Supreme Court has determined that an
analysis of the type of forum is an important consideration in deciding
the level of scrutiny to apply to the regulation. Thus, the place where
First Amendment rights are exercised is important. Beginning with
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,4 9
the Supreme Court modified the content-based/content-neutral analysis to include a study of the type of forum where speech is regulated.
Under the Perry forum analysis there are different types of forums for
First Amendment purposes. The government's right to regulate expression varies, depending on the distinction. In Perry, the Court
looked at the forum where the speech occurred and then at the statute in question to determine whether it was content-based or contentneutral. This analysis dictated the level of scrutiny to apply to determine whether the statute's time, place, and manner restrictions of
speech were reasonable.50
The following section first takes a brief look at the Court's analysis of content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech, prior
to the Perry decision. For convenience purposes, this comment will
refer to such analysis as "pre-Perryanalysis." Second, this section will
review the background of Perry and the "post-Perry" line of cases to
see how the forum, where speech occurs or is regulated, fits into free
49. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
50. Id. at 45-47; see also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); United
States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).
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speech analysis.
Pre-Perry Background on Free Speech Regulation Analysis
Content-Based Regulations of Speech
Widmar v. Vincent5 ' is an example of strict scrutiny analysis. In
this case the University of Missouri at Kansas City passed a University regulation that banned the use of school facilities "for purposes of
religious worship or religious teaching."52 The purpose underlying the
prohibition was the University's desire to maintain a strict separation
of church and state. The suit was brought by a religious group claiming that the regulation breached their First Amendment rights of free
speech and free exercise of religion. 4
The Court held that the regulation was based on the content of
speech and discriminated against students who wanted to engage in
such speech.5 5 The Widmar majority further held that for the restriction to be valid, the regulation must pass the Court's most "exacting
scrutiny."6 To pass strict scrutiny muster, the Court said that the
University's regulation must serve a compelling governmental interest
and be narrowly drawn to achieve that end.57 The Court held that the
University's interest in maintaining a separation of church and state
was not a sufficient compelling governmental interest to allow the content-based regulation of speech."'
Content-Neutral Regulations of Speech
6
is an example of pre-Perry contentUnited States v. O'Brien"
60
neutral analysis of speech regulation. In O'Brien, the defendant
burned his draft card on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse6 '
in violation of a federal statute that made it a crime for any person to
forge, alter, knowingly destroy, knowingly mutilate, or otherwise
change a draft card. 2 O'Brien defended his actions by telling the jury
that he burned the draft card publicly to influence others to adopt his

51. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). This scrutiny is the "most exacting scrutiny." Id. at 276;
see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978).
52. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265.
53. Id. at 270. The University claimed it derived this interest from the establishment clauses of the Federal and Missouri Constitutions. Id.
54. Id. at 265-66.
55. Id. at 269-70.
56. Id. at 270, 276.
57. Id. at 270.
58. Id. at 276.
59. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
60. Known as mid-level scrutiny under the Perry forum analysis. See Perry, 460
U.S. at 45.
61. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369.
62. Id.
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antiwar beliefs. 3 O'Brien argued that the statute was unconstitutional
as applied because it restricted his freedom of expression."' The Court
rejected this contention: "[w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." 65
The Court stated that the statute prohibited conduct, not free expression." The majority further stated that a law prohibiting the destruction of draft cards no more abridges free speech on its face, or in application, than does a motor vehicle law prohibiting the destruction of
drivers' licenses, or a tax law prohibiting the destruction of books or
records."
The O'Brien Court held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on protected speech. The Court set
forth the appropriate framework for such regulation by stating that:
(1) a government regulation is justified if the regulation is within the
constitutional power of the government; (2) if the regulation furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) if the government's interests are unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and (4) if the incidental suppression of alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than necessary in the furtherance of that interest. 9
The Court found that the statute in O'Brien met the above criteria and thus held the regulation and O'Brien's conviction to be constitutional."0 Consistent with the four criteria, the Court held that the
power of Congress to establish a system of registration to enlist manpower for military service is beyond debate. 7' Government has the authority to require that individuals comply with the registration system. This includes the promulgation of laws that prevent the
destruction of draft cards. 7' The Court went on to hold that the preservation of draft cards served important governmental interests that
would otherwise be thwarted by the card's destruction and that the
statute protected those interests.7 ' The Court then found that the
63. Id. at 370.
64. Id. at 376.
65. Id. Many protestors attempt to justify so called "expressive" illegal conduct as
action allowed in the First Amendment. Such alleged First Amendment expression is,
at times, classified as an after-the-thought justification for illegal conduct, especially
after those charged have spoken with their creative and imaginative lawyer.
66. Id. at 375.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 376.
69. Id. at 377.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755-58 (1948); Selective
Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918)).
72. Id. at 377-78.
73. Id. at 378-81. Some of the governmental interests cited by the Court were: (1)
the draft card served as proof that the person whose name appeared on the card had
registered for the draft; (2) the information on the draft card facilitated communica-
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statute, as applied, condemned only the independent noncommunicative act of O'Brien's burning of the draft card and thus was not, as
O'Brien asserted, a suppression of free speech."' Finally, the Court
held that there were "no alternative means that would more precisely
and narrowly assure the continuing availability of issued Selective
than a law which prohibits their wilful mutilation
Service certificates
75
or destruction."
The Importance of the Forum Where Speech Occurs or is Regulated
The 1983 Supreme Court decision of Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association71 focused on the type of
forum in which the speech was sought to be restricted. For the first
time, the Supreme Court made an effort to classify the types of forums on public property. This is significant because after Perry the
level of scrutiny depends not only upon whether the regulation is content-based or77 content-neutral, but also upon the type of forum which
is regulated.
In Perry, a teacher's union, the Perry Education Association
(PEA), was the duly elected exclusive bargaining representative of the
teachers in the school district.78 The collective bargaining agreement
gave the PEA exclusive access to the interschool mail system and the
teachers' mailboxes. 79 The rival union, the Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA), was denied similar access. The Supreme Court held
that the school district's denial of mailbox access to the PLEA did not
violate the PLEA's right of free speech. 0
The Perry Court recognized three distinct classifications of forums on public property and attached levels of First Amendment
scrutiny to each.81 First, there are forums that have traditionally been
used for assembly and free expression, such as public parks and sidewalks. In such forums, the Court will apply strict scrutiny to test the
constitutionality of a statute that regulates speech based upon its content. Strict scrutiny requires a compelling governmental interest in
support of a content based regulation of speech. If the regulation is
content neutral, however, the standard is lessened to a mid-level scrution between registrants and the draft board; (3) the draft card included reminders
that served to inform the registrant to notify the draft board of changes in address and
status; and (1)the draft card included warnings of unlawful conduct regarding the
draft card. Id. at 378-80.
74. Id. at 382.

75. Id. at 381.
76. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
77. Id. at 45.
78. Id. at 40.
79. Id. Rather than a statute placing a burden upon speech, in Perry it was the
collective bargaining agreement that was challenged as an unreasonable time, manner,
and place burden on speech.
80. Id. at 44-55.
81. Id. at 45-46.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol27/iss2/10

12

Durrant: Wyoming Hunt Interference Law - Anarchy in the Woods: How Far Afi
1992

COMMENT

tiny. Under mid-level analysis, time, manner, and place restrictions of
speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental
82
interest and leave open alternative channels of communication.
Second, where public property is not a traditional public forum,
but has been opened or specifically dedicated for use by the public as
a place for expressive activity, the level of scrutiny applied is the same
as that applied to the traditional public forum. If the regulation is
content-based, then strict scrutiny applies. But, if the restriction is
content-neutral, then mid-level scrutiny applies. The Court further
noted that once a nontraditional public forum has been opened for
free speech purposes, it is not required that the forum remain open to
subsequent expressive activity. 3
Third, regulations of speech which apply to public property which
is not by tradition or dedication a forum for public debate are scrutinized by lower standards."' The Perry Court classified the teachers'
mailboxes as a nontraditional/nondedicated forum and applied the rational relations standard to the collective bargaining restriction. Perry
thus set the precedent that speech regulation in a nontraditional/
nondedicated public forum must only meet the rational relations test,
the Court's lowest standard. Under rational relations scrutiny, the
government may regulate speech on a content-neutral basis if the regulation is supported by a reasonable governmental interest and the
regulation is rationally related to the attainment of that interest."s
The Perry Court recognized that the First Amendment does not
guarantee access to public or government property by holding that the
teachers' mailboxes fell into the nontraditional/nondedicated public
forum category and that the collective bargaining restriction was
valid." In the nontraditional/nondedicated public forum, the purposes
of the forum are important. The Perry Court looked at the school district's purposes for the regulation and found that the limited access
policy was reasonable because it was in line with the school district's
legitimate interest in "preserving the property . . . for the use to which
it is lawfully dedicated."87 The Court noted that restrictions of speech
in the nontraditional/nondedicated public forum are more liberal and

82. Id. at 45.
83. Id. at 45-46.
84. In describing the nontraditional public forum not dedicated or opened for free
speech purposes, the Perry Court used the term "nonpublic." The use of the word
"nonpublic" does not imply that such a forum is on private property. A nonpublic
forum, consistent with the Perry decision, is public property which is not dedicated or
opened to public debate purposes. Id. To eliminate confusion, this comment will utilize the term "nontraditional/nondedicated" to describe the third classification of public forum.
85. Id. at 46-55.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 50-51 (citing United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981)). This policy also furthered the school's interest in not "becoming a battlefield for inter-union squabbles." Id. at 53.
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allow distinctions:
Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to
make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and
speaker identity. These distinctions may be impermissible in a
public forum but are inherent and inescapable in the process of
limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended purpose of the property. The touchstone for evaluating
these distinctions is whether they are reasonable in light of the
purpose which the forum at issue serves. 8
Thus, in addition to time, manner, and place regulations, the
state may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative
or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not
an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose
the speaker's view. The Court noted that government, "no less than a
private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under
its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." '
In sum, the Court held that when government property is not
dedicated specifically for public debate purposes, nor traditionally
used for such, the government may, without further justification, restrict its use. 0 After Perry, it is important to categorize the type of
forum in which the restriction operates. This is because the level of
scrutiny depends not only upon whether the regulation is contentbased or content-neutral, but also upon the type of forum which is
regulated.' This analysis, exemplified by Perry and used in subsequent cases, is the standard by which regulations of speech on public
property are scrutinized.
In United States v.Grace,2 decided one month after Perry, the
Court utilized the Perry forum analysis to scrutinize a federal statute." Appellees, who were banned from the sidewalk outside the
United States Supreme Court building for picketing and leafletting,'
88. Id. at 49.
89. Id. at 46.
90. Id. at 53. The decision in City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984), also illustrates this third category of public forum distinction. The Supreme
Court upheld a city ordinance that prohibited the posting of signs on public property
and upheld the application of that ordinance to prohibit the placing of campaign signs
on street light posts. The majority opinion by Justice Stevens noted that light posts
are not traditionally dedicated to public communication and did not constitute a public forum. The prohibition of speech was permissible because it promoted important
governmental interests in aesthetic values and the environment which were unrelated
to the suppression of the particular viewpoint.
91. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
92. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
93. Id. at 176-77.
94. The Court held that the activities engaged in by appellees were protected
forms of speech. "There is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful picketing and
leafletting are expressive activities involving 'speech' protected by the First Amendment." Id.
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challenged the statute. The statute prohibited, in part, the "display
[of] any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party organization, or movement" 5 in the Supreme
Court building or on its grounds. The Court invalidated that portion
of the statute as far as it related to public sidewalks. In so doing, the
Court focused its attention on the forum, the sidewalks surrounding
the Supreme Court building, where the speech sought to be regulated
took place.98 The Court conducted a Perry forum analysis to decide
that the sidewalks were public sidewalks and therefore, a traditional
public forum.9 7 The majority then determined that the statute was
content-neutral and, therefore, the statute had to withstand mid-level
scrutiny." Under the Grace standard of mid-level scrutiny, a mild revision of the O'Brien standard, a statute is valid if the time, manner,
and place restrictions are: (1) content-neutral; (2) narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest; and (3) if the statute leaves
open ample alternative channels of communication. 9
The Court found that the federal statute failed part two of the
test. The stated purposes of the statute were to provide for the protection of the Supreme Court building and grounds and of the people
and property therein, as well as preserving the decorum of the
Court.'0 0 The Grace Court held that a ban on carrying a flag, banner,
or device on public sidewalks surrounding the building did not serve
those purposes, especially where no evidence was presented that the
picketing had barred access to the Supreme Court building.' 0 ' Thus,
the statute did not1 serve
a significant governmental interest and failed
02
mid-level scrutiny.
The Perry Court's tripartite framework for First Amendment
analysis in the different forums was further re-enforced by the 1990
decision of United States v. Kokinda.01 In this case, defendants were
convicted under a federal statute that prohibited soliciting contributions on the sidewalk in front of a post office entrance.' Because solicitation is a protected form of speech under the First Amendment, 1 5
the Court had to determine the applicable level of scrutiny.' 6 To de95. Id. at 172-73.
96. 1d. at 178-79.
97. Id. at 178-80.
98. Id. at 177.

99. Id.
100. Id. at 182.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 183-84.
103. 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).
104. Id. at 3118. The statute that defendants violated was 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(h)(1)
(1989), which provides in relevant part: "Soliciting alms and contributions, campaigning for election to any public office, collecting private debts, commercial soliciting and
vending, and displaying or distributing commercial advertising on postal premises are
prohibited." Id.
105. Id. (citing Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 629
(1980)).
106. Id.
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termine what level of scrutiny applied, the Court used the Perry forum analysis."7
By applying the Perry analysis, the Kokinda Court found that
the post office was not traditionally a place used for public assembly
and expression"0 8 and neither Congress nor the Postal Service had expressly dedicated or opened the post office property' 9 to any expressive activity, including solicitation.' 10 Based upon its finding that the
post office sidewalks were a nontraditional/nondedicated forum, and a
finding that the regulation was content-neutral, the Court applied the
rational relations test and found the regulation constitutional."' Specifically, the Court found the federal statute reasonable in light of the
congressionally stated purpose of the forum: "to accomplish the most
efficient postal delivery system."' 2 Solicitation, the Court held, was
disruptive to the postal service's purposes and thus could be reasonably regulated."'
The Kokinda Court held that the government may reserve the
nontraditional/nondedicated forum for its intended purposes as long
as the regulation of speech is reasonable and not content-based." 4
The Court noted that it is a long settled principle of law that governmental actions are subject to a lower level of scrutiny when "the governmental function operating . . . is not the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker, . . . but, rather, as proprietor, to manage its
internal operations....
The government, therefore, may place reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions on speech. Prior to Perry, the Court typically determined whether the statute was content-based or content-neutral to
set the scrutiny level. Under post-Perry analysis, the forum of the
speech also plays an important role. The Court retained the strict
scrutiny analysis because it applies to all public forums where a statute regulates the content of speech. The Court also retained the
O'Brien standard, although somewhat refined by the Grace decision,
for application of mid-level scrutiny. The post-Perry line of cases are
significant for the fact that they recognized a lower level of scrutiny,
107. Id. at 3119 (citing Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650-51 (1981), for the proposition that the "[clonsideration of a
forum's special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation since the
significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic
nature and function of the particular forum involved.").
108. Id. at 3121. See supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text for Perry forum
classifications.
109. A requirement under category two of the Perry framework. See Perry, 460
U.S. at 45-46.
110. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121.
111. Id. at 3124-25.
112. Id. at 3122 (citing 39 U.S.C. § 403(a), 403(b)(1) (1970)).
113. Id. at 3123.
114. Id. at 3124; see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
115. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3119 (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McEl-

roy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961)).
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the least demanding of all, called rational relations.
Under post-Perry analysis, restrictions of speech are subjected to
one of three levels of scrutiny: strict, mid-level, or rational relations.
Under strict scrutiny analysis, if a statute regulates speech based
upon content, the court will look to see if there is a compelling governmental interest in support of the statute and if the restriction on
speech is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." 6 Under mid-level
scrutiny, the government may regulate speech in the public forum if
the restrictions are content-neutral, if such restrictions are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and if the law
leaves open ample alternative means of communication." 7 Under rational relations analysis the courts will look to see if the government
has a rational basis to restrict speech and whether such restriction is
content-neutral and reasonable in light of the forum and governmental interests involved. 118 The courts use these levels of scrutiny to either uphold or invalidate statutes allegedly restrictive of free speech.
Thus, Perry teaches that if a statute regulates the content of
speech on public property, whether the forum is traditional, nontraditional but opened for public opinion purposes, or nontraditional/
nondedicated, a strict scrutiny analysis will apply. If a statute is a
content-neutral regulation of speech, and the forum is a traditional or
dedicated forum for public opinion purposes, the statute will be subjected to mid-level scrutiny. Finally, if a statute is content-neutral and
regulates speech on public property which is not a traditional forum,
nor has it been so opened or dedicated, it is only subject to rational
relations scrutiny."19
116. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
117. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177; Perry,460 U.S. at 45; see also Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
118. Perry, 460 U.S. at 49; Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121-22.
119. Perry was not the first case to incorporate the forum into First Amendment
analysis. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S.
640, 650-51 (1981); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972); Adderly
v. Florida 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939);
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). Perry was, however, the first case to classify public property into three distinct forums. The Court united the forum classification with an analysis of whether the regulation of speech is content-based or contentneutral in order to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny. As a result of Perry,
the following outline is helpful to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny for regulations that restrict speech on public property:
-

traditional public forum content-based (strict scrutiny)

-

content-neutral (mid-level scrutiny)

I.

non-traditional public forum opened or dedicated for First
Amendment activity - content-based (strict scrutiny)
- content-neutral (mid-level scrutiny)
III. non-traditional public forum not opened or dedicated for First Amendment activity II.

-

content-based (strict scrutiny)

content-neutral (rational relations scrutiny)
The strict scrutiny standard remains constant for each level of the public forums.
-
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ANALYSIS

All statutes must be tailored to overcome vagueness and overbreadth concerns. This analysis section will first address whether the
Wyoming statute passes constitutional muster under these doctrines.
Then this section will subject the Wyoming hunt interference statute
to a Perry forum analysis.
The Wyoming Hunt Interference Statute
The Wyoming hunt interference statute went into effect on July
1, 1991.120 The Wyoming statute, in pertinent part, provides:
§ 23-3-405. Interference with lawful taking of game animals, game
birds and game fish prohibited; penalties; damages; injunction.
(a) No person shall with the intent to prevent or hinder the
lawful taking of any game animal, game bird or game fish:
(i) Interfere with the lawful taking of or the process of lawfully taking any game animal, game bird or
game fish;
(ii) Engage in any activity intended to threaten or
otherwise affect the behavior of any game animal, game
bird or game fish.' 2'
Overcoming Vagueness and Overbreadth:Does Wyoming's Hunt Interference Statute Meet Grayned's Standard for Avoiding Vagueness
and Overbreadth?
If Wyoming's hunt interference statute is to withstand a constitutional challenge based on vagueness and overbreadth, it must avoid
the fatal flaws contained in Connecticut's invalidated statute. In its
framing of the hunt interference law, the Wyoming legislature took
care to avoid vagueness and overbreadth problems.
The Wyoming hunt interference statute must meet the requisites
outlined in Grayned in order to survive vagueness scrutiny.'
First,
laws must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what action is prohibited. The Wyoming hunt interference statute, by utilizing the words "interfere," "hinder," or "prevent," uses terms of common understanding and limits them to a
particular context, "interference with the lawful taking of or the proStrict scrutiny analysis did not change from pre-Perry standards to post-Perry analysis. If a regulation is content-based, strict scrutiny applies.
120. Act of Feb. 15, 1991, Ch.41, §2, 1991 Wvo. SEss. LAWS 124, 126.
121. WYo. STAT. § 23-3-405 (1991).
122. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
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cess of lawfully taking" game.' 23 Accidental violations are avoided because the statute mandates an "intent" to "interfere," "hinder," or
"prevent." Thus, reasonable notice is given as to the type of conduct
prohibited.
In Dorman, the invalidated hunt interference regulation used the
phrase "acts in preparation," a phrase not defined nor limited to time
and place within the Connecticut statute. The Wyoming statute, on
the other hand, uses "process of lawfully taking." This phrase is defined within the statute to mean "travel, camping and other acts preparatory to taking game animals . . . if occurring on lands or water
upon which the affected person may legally take the game ....
Thus, while the Wyoming statute also uses an "acts in preparation"
clause, the Wyoming statute avoids vagueness and overbreadth by
limiting its restriction to time and place by definition.12 5 Definitions of
additional terms used within the statute may be found in the same
Game and Fish section of the Wyoming Statutes. 2 6 For example, the
terms "game animal," "game bird," and "game fish" are defined under
the "definitions of wildlife" section.'2 7 The term "take" is defined by
the Wyoming statutes to mean "hunt, pursue, catch, capture, shoot,
fish, seine, trap, kill, or possess, or attempt to hunt, pursue, catch,
capture, shoot, fish, seine, trap, kill, or possess."'2 8 The term "person,"
as used in the Wyoming statutes is defined to mean an "individual,
partnership, corporation, company, or any other type of association,
and any agent or officer of any partnership, corporation, company, or
other type of association."' 2 9 The Grayned Court noted that it is a
basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness
if its regulations are not clearly defined.' 30 Terms used in the Wyoming hunt interference statute that may not be of common understanding are reasonably defined. Given the clarity and definition of
the terms, the Wyoming hunt interference statute gives fair notice in
words of common understanding to those who might violate it.
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, the laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply
them.' 3 ' The Wyoming hunt interference statute prohibits conduct
that is intended to interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife. Such
conduct can easily be measured by the conduct's impact on the nor-

123. WYo. STAT.
124. WYo. STAT.

§ 23-3-405 (1991).
§ 23-3-405(h) (1991) (emphasis added).

125. Id. Thus the vagueness and overbreadth concerns (time and place) of the
Dorman court, that protests at the local sporting goods store would also be prohibited,
are alleviated by the Wyoming statute's restriction of the acts in preparation clause to
a specific time and place (where game can lawfully be taken).
126. Wvo. STAT. §§ 23-1-101, 102 (1991).
127. Wvo. STAT. § 23-1-101(a)(i), (iv), (v), (xi) (1991).
128. WYo STAT. § 23-1-102(a)(vii) (1991).
129. WYo. STAT. § 23-1-102(a)(viii) (1991).
130. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
131. Id.
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mal activity of the forum."' 2 Like the Rockford statute in Grayned
which prohibited conduct disruptive to a forum whose purposes were
school activities, Wyoming's hunt interference statute prohibits conduct disruptive to a forum whose purposes include hunting and
fishing.
Terms relating to the prohibited conduct that may elude common
understanding, such as "taking," "person," or "game animals, fish or
The Wyoming hunt
birds" are defined by the Wyoming statutes.'
interference statute describes what type of interference is prohibited
(i.e., interference that prevents or hinders the lawful taking of any
game animal). By using words of common understanding such as "interfere,'1 34 and defining other terms, the Wyoming statute provides
easily ascertainable standards for enforcement.'3 5 Woodcutting, trail
riding, hiking, and even talking are just some of the activities that
take place in hunt areas that are lawful. But, if such activities are
done with the intent to prevent, hinder, or otherwise interfere with
the lawful taking of wildlife, these activities become unlawful. The key
phrase in the Wyoming statute, therefore, is "with the intent to prevent or hinder the taking ... "136 By requiring a threshold determination of intent, the Wyoming hunt interference statute is clear as to the
disruptive conduct prohibited, leaving little room for error through arbitrary enforcement.
Third, where a vague statute "abuts upon sensitive areas of basic
First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of those
freedoms." 13' 7 Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to " 'steer
far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."' 3 8 The Wyoming hunt interference
statute clearly provides that conduct not intended to interfere with
the lawful taking of wildlife is not regulated. It is only disruptive conduct which intentionally interferes, impedes, or hinders the lawful
132. Id. at 116.

133. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
134. A WESTLAW search of the Wyoming statutes revealed that the term "interfere," or its roots, appears 136 times in the collective Wyoming statutes. Wyoming
would have substantial revisions to its statutes if the term "interfere" was declared
vague. This is a good argument that the term "interfere" is a term of common understanding and therefore not vague or overbroad.
135. The Congressional Research Service noted that a statute or court could avoid
any problems of constitutional overbreadth or vagueness by defining or construing the
word "interfere" to refer only to physical interference, whether accomplished by
speech or otherwise. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE SPORT HUNTING SAFETY
AND PRESERVATION ACT OF 1991: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF H.R. 371, 102D CONGRESS, at
CRS-3 n.8, CRS-5 (1991 predistribution copy). Accordingly, the term "interfere"
would be understood not to imply that pure speech is prohibited. It appears that the
association of terms like "interfere" with certain types of prohibited conduct is also an
adequate way to avoid problems of vagueness or overbreadth. The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress is an independent research service which
does analysis of proposed bills to determine constitutionality.
136. WYO. STAT. § 23-3-405(a) (1991).
137. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109.
138. Id. (citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).
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hunt that is prohibited." 9 The viewpoint of the interferer is unimportant. The focus of the statute is upon the intent of his or her
interference.
Thus, the Wyoming hunt interference statute is narrowly tailored
to prohibit only disruptive conduct and does not, therefore, unnecessarily intrude upon basic First Amendment freedoms. By using terms
of common understanding and by defining others, the Wyoming legislature has taken precautions to avoid vagueness of terms that could
invalidate any statute.14
Regarding overbreadth, a comparison of the Wyoming hunt interference statute and the ordinance at issue in Grayned v. City of Rockford 14' is enlightening. The Rockford statute was designed for the protection of school activities. Wyoming's hunt interference statute also
protects a legal activity: the lawful taking of wildlife.'" The Rockford
ordinance placed a time, place, and manner restriction on disruptive
speech to protect school activities. The ordinance was limited in time
to the hours while school was in session, restricted in place to the
property surrounding the school, and limited in scope to disruptive
activities. The Wyoming hunt interference statute advances the
State's interests of protecting its citizens from armed or physical confrontation, preserving a legal activity, and furthering wildlife management goals.' 42 It does this much like the statute in Grayned by placing
a reasonable time, manner, and place restriction on speech. The hunt
interference statute forbids disruptive activity at a specific time (during the taking process), at a sufficiently fixed place (in the area of the
lawful taking),' and in a specific manner (the statute limits the scope
of its restriction to conduct that intentionally hinders or prevents the
lawful taking of wildlife).
The reasons for implementing the Rockford school ordinance are
similar to those for enacting the hunt interference statutes. In both
cases there exists a need to protect a legal activity in progress. Disrup139. Intentional interference with a hunter or fisherman is not the only conduct
prohibited by the Wyoming statute. Any activity intended to threaten or otherwise
affect the behavior of wildlife is also violative. A hunter or an anti-hunt activists who
intentionally affects a game animal's behavior, in order to interfere with the lawful
taking process by another, is also violating the statute. WYo. STAT. § 23-3-405(a)(ii)
(1991). The Wyoming hunt interference law excuses from its reaches private land owners while on their own property. Wvo. STAT. § 23-3-405(g)(ii) (1991).
140. For an example of terms used and terms defined, see supra notes 123-29 and
accompanying text.
141. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
142. Wyoming's hunt interference statute does not protect the illegal methods of
taking wildlife, such as poaching. Poaching is the process of illegally taking game without a proper license and/or out of season. Wvo. STAT. §§ 23-3-102, 103 (1991).
143. Although the interests involved in Grayned and the hunt interference statutes may be distinguished, these interests are common in that they protect a legal
activity and the rights of participants of those activities.
144. The place the statute regulates is specifically designated within the statute.
WYo. STAT. § 23-3-405(h) (1991). Thus, only where the taking of game is lawful is the
statute in effect.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1992

21

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 27 [1992], Iss. 2, Art. 10
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVII

tion of legal hunting and fishing activities could result in serious consequences. Animal activists typically blow air horns, chant, bait
hunters with verbal abuse, vandalize, and use other tactics to disrupt
the lawful taking of game.' 45 The result of hunt interference, absent
the statute, is that the State's effort and responsibility 4 " to ensure the
peace and safety of its citizens and to manage the wildlife 4 7 can be
frustrated. 4"

145. See supra notes 2-3.
146. Wildlife belong to the state. WYo. STAT. § 23-1-103 (1991). Accordingly, the
state has the responsibility of and an interest in managing wildlife. Id.
147. Without wildlife management, overpopulation for a certain feed area would
result and wildlife would begin to look to other places for food. The deer and elk herds
may wander onto farms and ranches and compete with livestock for available feed,
causing great financial loss to the ranchers and the State through damage claims.
Predators (mountain lions, coyotes, etc.) also wander in search for food, following game
as a food source. They kill livestock, and again the loss is financial. An additional
danger with predators is that they often wander into towns and cities in search of food,
increasing the chance for predator/human confrontation. Cities in Colorado, including
Denver, Colorado Springs, and Boulder, have experienced many mountain lion/human
confrontations as the big cats have wandered into the cities. These instances have been
documented in local newspapers. See Cougar Caught, Released, RocKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Jan. 28, 1992, at 10; Gary Gerhardt, Instinct Likely Caused Lion to Kill Youth,
Expert Says, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 25, 1991, at 16; Gary Gerhardt, Springs
Police Shoot Cougar With Spaniel In Its Mouth, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 26,

1991, at 10; John C. Ensslin, Cougar's Action Forced His Death, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Sept. 9, 1991, at 6.
148. The wildlife biologists and professionals of the Wyoming Game & Fish Department have recognized that the tactics used by some animal rights groups to interfere with lawful hunting and fishing activities, pose a serious threat to scientifically
proven methods that they employ to manage wildlife. WYOMING GAME & FISH DEPARTMENT, PLANNING REPORT #20, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND WILDLIFE MANAGE-

MENT IN WYOMING (1989).

The Yellowstone elk and bison herds are good examples of how the animal rights
movement has hurt otherwise effective wildlife management techniques. Scott Skinner,
Hunt on Hold, WYo. WILDLIFE, Oct. 1991, at 12-15. Bison were originally confined to
the Grand Teton National Park. Id. at 12. Because of overpopulation and failure of
other population control techniques besides hunting, the bison found their way down
to the National Elk Refuge outside of Jackson, which was designed only to winter elk.
Id. Now the bison compete with elk in already overcrowded conditions for winter feed.
Id. at 14. The bison have caused trouble on the feed grounds by shouldering the elk
aside (one buffalo can consume as much forage as four or five elk) and occasionally
goring and seriously wounding elk. Id. Because of legal action by an animal rights
group, wildlife biologists are unable to control the population of the buffalo herd by
issuing a certain number of hunting permits. Id. at 14, 15. Harry Harju, supervisor of
Biological Services expressed his frustrations regarding the limited wildlife management techniques available:
We want bison to be a part of the Jackson Hole system, but we must he able to
control the herd. We feel that legal sport hunting is the best way to do that. Hunting generates money that can be used on behalf of wildlife. It provides recreation
and it solves the problem. Properly regulated hunting is an efficient game management tool, Animals as big as bison need to be controlled. If they aren't, habitat
destruction and conflicts with wildlife and man will result. If we're going to have
bison, we're going to have to be able to control them ....
Some people would
prefer department employees to cull the herd, but we don't like that. We'd rather
not have buffalo than have to manage them that way. It's expensive, time consuming, and it eliminates public participation. Nobody has come up with an alternative better than sport hunting.
Id. at 15 (emphasis added). But buffalo hunting is currently not allowed in Wyoming,
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Like the Rockford ordinance, the Wyoming hunt interference
statute does not seek to punish a person because of the content of his
or her speech, but only for disruptive conduct inconsistent with the
purposes of the particular forum.'4 9 Just as the Rockford ordinance
was narrowly tailored to further the City's interest and did not unnecessarily interfere with First Amendment rights, the Wyoming hunt interference statute is narrowly tailored to prohibit only disruptive conduct intended to interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife. Thus, the
Wyoming hunt interference statute, like the Rockford ordinance,
''represents a considered and specific legislative judgment that some
kinds of expressive activity should be restricted at a particular time
and place" to accomplish the interests and goals of the government. 50
First Amendment Analysis
In the First Amendment context, the first question that must be
answered is whether Wyoming's hunt interference statute, and similar
statutes adopted by forty-four other states, are indeed restrictions of
free speech. An argument that they are not is backed by sound logic
and case law.
First Amendment protections may apply to pure speech or speech
and conduct combined. When laws are not directed at the views expressed, as here, any hindrance of speech that results from such a law
is merely incidental, and no First Amendment issue arises.' 5' Under
the Wyoming statute, expression such as peaceful distribution of
handbills and quiet speech that does not interfere with the purposes
of the forum or the lawful activity in progress would not be prohibited. The hunt interference statute prohibits speech or conduct only
where the primary intent and result is not to express an idea, but to
interfere with the legal actions of others (here, the lawful taking of
wildlife).
Considering some of the tactics employed by certain animal rights
groups, i.e., air horns, vandalism, theft, and even violent physical confrontation,"5 2 the intent of such conduct is not to communicate.
Rather, it is to interfere, impede, and stop the lawful activity in progress. Such activists groups attempt to cloak their conduct in the First

presenting herd management problems for the Game & Fish Department.
149. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116-18.
150. Id. at 121.
151. LAURENCE H TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 828 (1988). See also

Racicot, 8 Mont. Fed. Rep. at 469 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) which
held " . . . [wihere a statute does not directly abridge free speech, but-while regulating a subject within the State's power-tends to have the incidental effect of inhibiting
First Amendment rights, it is well settled that the statute can be upheld if the effect
on speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct and the lack of
alternative means for doing so.").
152. See supra notes 2-3.
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Amendment.' 53 However, it is basic First Amendment law that where
conduct or speech has no communicative value, free speech protections do not apply.6 4 For example, "[riegulations of loud noises used
not to communicate but instead to shatter glass, or pamphlets used
not to express anything but to cover the ground with litter, need not
16
trigger any [F]irst [A]mendment scrutiny at all."
Likewise, if someone shouted the Lord's Prayer in order to drive
away game or otherwise interfere with a hunt, that person, once
charged, could not validly claim that his religious or First Amendment
freedoms had been violated. This is because such speech was not intended as communication. Such speech is classified as conduct intended to drive away game or otherwise interfere with the lawful
hunt. It is this type of conduct that the Wyoming hunt interference
statute seeks to regulate. The O'Brien Court spoke to this issue: "[wie
cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct
can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends thereby to express an idea."'"" The Court noted that the statute there in question, prohibited conduct, not expression. The Wyoming hunt interference statute likewise prohibits conduct, not speech.
Thus, where the speech and conduct of the animal rights activists in
public hunting and fishing areas is noncommunicative, and meant
only to disrupt, no First Amendment issue exists.
Assuming that Wyoming's hunt interference statute places more

153. In NOW v. Operation Rescue, 747 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1990), antiabortion
activists claimed, similar to claims asserted by animal rights activists, that their First
Amendment rights allowed them to engage in illegal and tortious acts of trespassing,
impeding a legal activity, blockading and obstructing the entrance to an abortion
clinic. Id. at 769. The United States District Court held that such conduct is not protected by the First Amendment and refused to extend free speech protections. Id.; see
also New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989);
Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1989); National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989); Armes v. City of Philadelphia, 706 F.
Supp. 1156 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d
1342 (3d Cir. 1989).
Some antiabortion groups, like some animal rights activists, claim that the common law doctrine of justification excuses their irrational conduct. This was the argument made by defendants in NOW v. OperationRescue, supra. Since they believe that
abortion kills human beings, defendants argued that they were acting to prevent a
greater harm, therefore their lawless action was justified. This is the same argument
made by animal rights activists, but in another context, of course. However, the United
States District Court noted that the harm defendants sought to protect was a legally
protected activity, therefore there was no injury to defendants. 747 F. Supp. at 769.
Without injury, unlawful conduct cannot be justified. Id. at 769-70. Thus, the court
held that the principle of justification was baseless in this context. Again, it is easy to
draw an analogy to the animal rights issue regarding hunt interference statutes. Hunting and fishing are legally protected activities. Thus, no injury results to the activists
and the justification theory is also baseless in the hunt interference context.
154. "Where demonstrations turn violent, they lose their protected quality as expression under the First Amendment." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116. Conduct, otherwise
illegal, is not protected expression under the First Amendment.
155. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 831 (1988).
156. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
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than an incidental restriction upon free speech, a First Amendment
analysis would probably be conducted by a reviewing court. The following section will analyze the Wyoming statute under a Perry forum
analysis according to established United States Supreme Court
precedent.
Perry Analysis
This section will first determine whether the Wyoming hunt interference statute is content-based or content-neutral. Then the analysis will determine what type of forum the Wyoming statute seeks to
regulate. The appropriate level of scrutiny will then be applied to see
whether the hunt interference statute passes constitutional standards.
The Wyoming Hunt Interference Statute: Content-Based or ContentNeutral?
A content-based regulation of speech would be one that seeks to
suppress particular ideas. For example, if the Wyoming statute
banned antihunting or animal rights views, or left the forum open to
all groups but antihunting or animal rights groups, such a statute
would be content-based and must pass strict scrutiny. To support
such a regulation, a state must show that its regulation is necessary to
serve a compelling governmental interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.' Considering the emotional nature of the
issue and the confrontational tactics used by some anti-hunting
groups, and given the fact that hunters (and in some cases, the activists) are armed, there may exist a compelling governmental interest to
ensure the safety of citizens.' 6 8
The Wyoming hunt interference statute does not outlaw proanimal or antihunting views from the forests. Rather it only bans interference with the lawful taking of wildlife, regardless of whether
that interference originates from animal rights activists or other person. The content-neutrality of a statute is not lost simply because a
law places an incidental burden on some speakers more than others.' 9
157. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
158. In Dorman, 862 F.2d at 437, the court, in dicta, opined that the Connecticut
hunt interference statute could not withstand strict scrutiny required of a contentbased statute. But the court limited its observation to the fact that there was no showing of a compelling governmental interest. Id. It should be noted that the issues before
the court were those of vagueness and overbreadth, and a showing of a compelling
interest, therefore, was not required. Thus, the Dorman case does not stand for the
proposition that hunt interference statutes cannot withstand a strict scrutiny analysis.
159. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (holding that
the City's interest in zoning justified a time, manner, and place restriction on speech
by an adult theater). See also Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986). In
Arcara the Court upheld the closure of an adult bookstore where prostitution was taking place. The statute in question was aimed at the illegal conduct of prostitution, not
at quashing free expression. The Court further held that sexual conduct, as a result of
prostitution, "manifests absolutely no element of protected expression." Id. at 705.
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Thus, it may be logically concluded that the Wyoming statute is a
content-neutral law. The rest of this analysis will proceed on that
basis.
Looking at the Forum that the Wyoming Hunt Interference Statute
Seeks to Regulate
For analysis purposes, a quick review of the Perry holding is appropriate. A statute that regulates speech based upon its content in
any public forum will be tested under strict scrutiny analysis. 6 ' If the
regulation is content-neutral, and the forum is either a traditional
public forum or has been dedicated or opened to public expression,
the scrutiny is lessened to mid-level standards.16 ' Public property
which is not by designation or tradition a forum for free speech purposes is a nontraditional/nondedicated forum for speech purposes and
is governed by lower standards. A content-neutral time, manner, and
place regulation of speech in this setting must only meet the rational
relations standard.'6 2 For analysis purposes, it is necessary to decide
which category of public forum public hunting and fishing areas fall
under.' 3
Traditional Public Forum. Under post-Perry analysis, hunting
and fishing areas do not fit the criteria of the traditional public forum.
There is no case law holding that such areas are traditional public
forums used for the purpose of free exchange of ideas.'" 4 Indeed,
places considered traditional public forums have been limited by Supreme Court decisions to include public streets, sidewalks and
parks.' 65 Even these forums are subject to limitations.' 6 If a court
classified hunting and fishing areas as traditional public forums, such
a finding would not be fatal to the analysis. The Wyoming hunt interference statute, as a content-neutral regulation of speech, would be
subjected to a mid-level analysis, and the issue logically becomes
Correspondingly, Wyoming's hunt interference statute is aimed at illegal conduct, not
at stifling the expression of ideas. The extreme acts of certain anti-hunting groups are
aimed at hindering or stopping the lawful activity in progress, not at communication.
Thus, such conduct, like the conduct banned in Arcara, bears absolutely no element of
protected speech and may not be asserted as First Amendment activity.
160. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 46.
163. For purposes of this comment, the issue of the impact of hunt interference
regulations on private property will not be treated. This is because the statute's greatest impact is on public hunting and fishing areas.
164. The fact that property may be open to the public does not mean that such
areas must be treated as a traditional public forum for First Amendment purposes.
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121. Indeed, it is a long settled principle of law that governmental actions are subject to a lower level of scrutiny when "the governmental function operating

.

.. is not the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker ....

but, rather,

as proprietor, to manage its internal operations ..... Id. at 3119 (citing Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961)).
165. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
166. Id.
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whether the Wyoming hunt interference statute is a reasonable time,
manner, and place restriction of speech under the three-part test outlined in Grace.'" 7
Under mid-level scrutiny, a governmental regulation of expression
is justified if it is content-neutral, if it is narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and if it leaves open alternative
channels of communication. 68' As the above analysis has shown, the
Wyoming hunt interference statute does not seek to regulate a particular viewpoint.16 9 Therefore, as constructed, it is a content-neutral
regulation of speech, which at the most merits mid-level scrutiny.
Wyoming's hunt interference statute must also further significant
governmental purposes. The purposes of Wyoming's hunt interference
statute are to ensure the safety of the state's citizens, to enable the
Game and Fish Department to manage wildlife through a legal taking
process, to maintain a constant and manageable population of certain
species thereby maintaining the health of the herd and preserving
habitat, to attain an equilibrium where man and wildlife can cohabitate without unreasonable interference from the other, to control disease spread from wildlife to humans and domestic animals, to ensure
revenue to the federal government and the State of Wyoming, and to
acquire new lands for all forms of outdoor recreation, including hunting and fishing areas170
The most significant governmental interest supporting Wyoming's hunt interference statute is the safety of the citizens.1 7 ' This
governmental interest would fall under a state's police power to prolegal activities,
tect the lives and quiet of all persons, public property,
72
and those who participate in those activities.'
Who pays for wildlife and habitat management is another interest
of the state and federal governments. The management of wildlife and
habitat by game and fish agencies is a large responsibility, involving
thousands of people working for the well-being of game and non-game
species alike. The costs of managing our wildlife are extremely high,
with hundreds of millions of dollars spent each year. Unlike other governmental agencies, game and fish departments receive little support
from taxes paid by the general public. Through license fees and special excise taxes '7 on hunting and fishing equipment, government has
167. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
170. These state interests were brought to light in an interview with Mark 0. Harris, State Representative, State of Wyoming, in Cheyenne, Wyoming (Oct. 3, 1991).
Mr. Harris is the impetus and original author of Wyoming's hunt interference law.
171. Where one or both parties have weapons because of the lawful hunting activity involved, even if not for the purpose of antagonism of the opposing party, the government interest of safety would be important and substantial (if not compelling) to
support hunt interference statutes.
172. See Opinion of the Justices, 509 A.2d 749, 750-51 (N.H. 1986).
173. See PITTMAN-ROBERTSON WILDLIFE RESTORATION ACT, 16 U.S.C. § 669 (1988).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1992

27

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 27 [1992], Iss. 2, Art. 10
Vol. XXVII

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

placed the burden of funding wildlife management on sportsmen and
sportswomen. Without these funds, the wildlife conservation effort
managewould be severely hindered and thousands of jobs in wildlife
74
ment and the sporting goods industry would be lost.'
Another significant interest is the state's responsibility to maintain and care for wildlife. This responsibility falls to the state and its
game and fish agency. 75 Aldo Leopold, a preeminent conservationist,
was the main force behind the American Game Policy, introduced in
7
1930 and later adopted, as policy, by the Pittman-Robertson Act.'
This policy required that state game and fish agencies be staffed with
highly7 trained wildlife biologists and wildlife management specialists.'1 These specialists have determined through practice and studies
that, although hunting is not a wildlife management cure-all, a monitored hunt of some species is an effective wildlife management tool in
maintaining proper population size for a given area of feed and
habitat.'7 8 The interference of this management activity could be dev-

In 1991, $354 million raised from excise taxes on sporting equipment were used to help

fund state fish and wildlife restoration programs. Interior Secretary Lujan Announces
$354 Million for State Wildlife Projects,Dep't of the Interior News Release, Mar. 19,
1991.
174. NATIONAL SHOOTING SPORTS FOUNDATION, THE HUNTER AND CONSERVATION 10

(1989) [hereinafter CONSERVATION]. License fees are the largest portion of funds raised
for state game and fish departments, presently furnishing them with nearly $800 million a year. Id. at 12. Hunters have paid some $7 billion for conservation through excise taxes, licenses and permits. Id. at 22. Surveys by the U.S. government show that
hunters and fishermen pour over $38 billion into the nation's economy each year. Id.
The Wyoming Game and Fish Department's annual report showed that hunters, fishermen, and trappers spent more than $600 million in 1990 in the State of Wyoming. As
a group, these sportsmen spent over $14 million on Wyoming licenses alone in 1990.
Chris Madsen, Without the Hunt, WYo. WILDLIFE, Jan. 1991, at 22. A great deal of this
money finds its way to conservation programs benefitting management techniques and
studies of game and non-game animals.
175. WYo. STAT. §§ 23-1-103, 302 (1991).

176. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,
RESTORING AMERICA'S WILDLIFE 2 (1987). The Pittman-Robertson Act provides federal
funds derived from excise taxes on hunting and fishing equipment to state game and
fish agencies to help foster wildlife and habitat management. Id. at 4. One of the requirements that state game and fish agencies must follow in order to be eligible for
these funds is that their personnel be trained and competent to perform their duties.
Id. at 12.
177. Id.
178. The following are some examples of texts on wildlife management that re-

gard hunting as a valuable population maintenance tool:

ALDO LEOPOLD, GAME MAN-

(1933); Steve W. Chadde & Charles E. Kay, Tall-Willow Communities on
Yellowstone's Northern Range: A Test of the "Natural Regulation" Paradigm,in THE
GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM 231, 237-38, 255-58 (Robert B. Keiter & Mark S.
Boyce eds., 1991); John J. Craighead, Yellowstone in Transition,in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM 27, 31-32 (Robert B. Keiter & Mark S. Boyce eds., 1991); MARK
S. BOYCE, THE JACKSON ELK HERD: INTENSIVE WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN NORTH
AMERICA (1989); GAME MANAGEMENT IN MONTANA (Thomas W. Mussehl & F.W. Howell
eds., 1971); STANLEY H. ANDERSON, MANAGING OUR WILDLIFE RESOURCES (1985); GAME
HARVEST MANAGEMENT (Samuel L. Beasom & Sheila F. Roberson eds., 1985); ELK OF
NORTH AMERICA: ECOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT (Jack Ward Thomas & Dale E. Toweill
eds., 1982).
AGEMENT
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astating to wildlife and domestic livestock.'7 9
Wildlife is a resource that cannot be stockpiled, therefore unregulated population increase is not feasible. Nor is unregulated hunting
feasible. By the turn of the century, unregulated hunting by those
who hunted for profit had decimated many species, including elk, antelope, and buffalo. Through careful wildlife management practices
these species, and many others, were replenished.' 80 But new
problems have surfaced.
Society's increasing needs have caused expansive urban development. Man's use of natural resources to support this urban explosion
has decreased the availability of wildlife range and habitat, increasing
the need for sound wildlife management techniques. Now, overpopulation of wildlife has created grave problems for man and for species.
Too many animals on too small an area could destroy an entire population from simple lack of feed and disease.' 8' This problem escalates
in the winter. In a hard winter, when an overpopulated game herd
depletes all of the available food, death by starvation is inevitable.
179. Elk and bison in the Yellowstone area are carriers of a disease called brucellosis. Brucellosis can be transmitted from the bison and elk to domestic cattle, causing
them to abort their young. Ranchers in the area are worried that their cattle will be
infected with the disease. The issue mushroomed recently when Parker Land and Cattle Co. of Dubois, Wyoming, sued the State of Wyoming Game and Fish Department.
The company subsequently sued the Forest Service, Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Bureau of Land Management. Parker Cattle Co. claimed that it
had to destroy 620 head of its cattle after they contracted brucellosis in pastures contaminated by the feces, urine and afterbirth of elk. See Gary Gerhardt, The Killing
Fields, RocKv MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 9, 1992, at 10.
180. For example, in 1907 elk were common only in and around Yellowstone National Park. Because of careful management techniques, today there are more than
500,000 elk in the United States. CONSERVATION, supra note 174, at 21. In Yellowstone
National Park, where the control effect of public hunting is prohibited, the elk have
multiplied so fast they are destroying their habitat and that of other species. See
Chadde & Kay, supra note 178, at 255-58; Craighead, supra note 178, at 31-32 (rejecting the natural regulation or "hands off" wildlife management theory, stating "[lt
has been based on the erroneous notion that biotic communities can regulate themselves within artificial boundaries and in areas where man is a massive intruder. The
result has been a serious overpopulation of elk and bison, with corresponding decline
in whitetail, mule deer, beaver, and other species.").
181. Some animal rights groups oppose wildlife management techniques that include the harvesting of animals to control wildlife populations. However, amidst
charges of hypocrisy, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) tried their
own brand of game management.
According to reports in the WASHINGTON POST and the MONTGOMERY JOURNAL,
PETA had "rescued," from supposed inhumane conditions, some rabbits from a school
and some roosters from a private residence. Circus Blasts 'Animal Rights' Groups
Killing 'Rescued' Rabbits and Roosters, PR Newswire, Apr. 30, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library. The activists group kept the animals at their sanctuary facility
until conditions became overcrowded. To solve the problem, PETA killed 18 rabbits
and 14 roosters. Id. A PETA spokesperson said the mass killings were necessary because the conditions were overcrowded and that the "mercy killings" were consistent
with animal rights philosophy. Id. Critics blasted the activist group by saying that
PETA follows a double standard and that "[PETA] is an extremist cult that is seeking
to impose its own radical philosophy on the public while following its own weird interpretation of what is ethical treatment of animals." Id.
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Predators attack hunger-weakened stragglers. Disease and parasites
add to the toll.'8 2 The end result is a weak, unhealthy herd containing
far fewer animals than would be present had surplus animals been
thinned out in the fall hunt.8 3 Therefore, hunting, through its role as
a wildlife management tool, rises to the level of a significant governmental interest, thus satisfying that part of mid-level scrutiny.
The Wyoming hunt interference statute must utilize appropriately narrow means to protect the governmental interests involved.
The statute does so by prohibiting only the independent noncommunicative impact of interfering with a legal hunt. The Wyoming
statute confines its limitations on speech to time, manner, and place.
The time of the restriction is during the "process of lawfully taking
wildlife."' 8 4 This is defined within the statute to mean travel, camping, and other preparatory acts, if occurring on lands where game may
be lawfully taken."8 5 The activity regulated is conduct meant to interfere with the legal taking of wildlife. Only where speech is used as a
tool and is intended to prevent, hinder, interfere, or threaten the legal
taking of wildlife, does the statute impose its regulations.
The use of speech to intentionally interfere with a hunt is conduct. It is conduct because the speech is not intended to communicate, but rather to interfere. The United States Supreme Court held
that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest
in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations
on protected speech."8 The harm which the hunt interference statute
seeks to prevent does not flow from the content of the speaker's message, but from his conduct. The state has a valid interest in regulating
that conduct. s1 Thus, the Wyoming statute is sufficiently tailored to
narrowly regulate disruptive conduct. Any regulation of protected
speech is merely incidental and insignificant when balanced against
the governmental purposes involved.
Finally, the Wyoming hunt interference statute must leave open
ample alternative channels of communication. The hunt interference
statute only affects hunting and fishing areas.'88 The statute does not
seek to regulate speech in traditional public forums. Those who wish
to voice views in opposition of a hunt still have the traditional public
182. CONSERVATION, supra note 174, at 4, 5.
183. Id. at 5. See also supra note 178 for additional authority.
184. See WYo. STAT. § 23-3-405(h) (1991).

185. Id.
186. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
187. Otherwise, someone who is arrested for running a red light would be entitled
to First Amendment protection if that person were a newscaster late for work or a
professor late to a lecture. Book selling in an establishment used for prostitution does
not confer First Amendment protections to defeat a valid statute aimed at penalizing
and terminating illegal use of the premises. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S.
697, 705 (1986).
188. WYo. STAT. § 23-3-405(h) (1991).
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forums open to them as alternative channels of communication. These
traditional public forums include public parks, streets, sidewalks, and
those places specifically set aside for public debate."" Because the
Wyoming statute limits its restrictions to areas where game can lawfully be taken, picketing on a public sidewalk in front of a sporting
goods store is not prohibited.'9 0 Therefore, the Wyoming hunt interference statute leaves traditionally effective means of communication
unregulated for animal rights activists to air their views.
Under mid-level analysis, the Wyoming hunt interference statute
is constitutionally sound. The Wyoming statute is an example of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions of speech or conduct.
The Wyoming statute is not based on the content of speech, but
rather is content-neutral. The type of speech sought to be restricted
by the Wyoming statute has not been held by the courts to be protected speech. Rather, it is not speech at all, but intrusive conduct,
meant to interfere. The State has numerous valid interests in regulating such conduct. Additionally, the Wyoming hunt interference statute is narrow in application to achieve specific substantial governmental interests and the statute leaves open all traditional channels for
expressing antihunting viewpoints. Thus, the statute passes muster
under mid-level analysis.
Nontraditional Public Forum: Opened or Dedicated for Public
Debate Purposes. Public hunting and fishing areas do not fit the criteria of the nontraditional public forum dedicated or opened for First
Amendment purposes. Neither Congress, nor the Forest Service, has
expressly dedicated or opened the national forests to expressive activity,' particularly activity intended to interfere with the lawful taking
of wildlife. In fact, Congress has dedicated the national forests for
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish
purposes.' 9' Again, even if a court decided that hunting and fishing
areas were dedicated by the appropriate governmental body for free
speech purposes,' the Wyoming statute would only have to meet the
Grace standard of mid-level scrutiny. As shown by above analysis, the
Wyoming statute meets that burden.
Nontraditional/NondedicatedPublic Forum. The Perry analysis,

189. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3119.
190. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
191. Outdoor recreation, one of the purposes to which the national forests are
dedicated, may be imaginatively considered expressive activity. But clearly, tactics of
anti-hunt protestors do not fall within the purposes for which the forests, or other
public hunting and fishing areas, were dedicated.
192. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1988).
193. Even though the national forests allow some form of expression through outdoor recreation, this does not add up to the dedication of national forests to First
Amendment speech activities. Indeed, "the government does not create a public forum
by . . . permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a non-traditional forum for public discourse." Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121 (citing Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).
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as used in Kokinda, supports the assertion that public hunting and
fishing areas fall into the third level forum (nontraditional/nondedicated public forum), and thus time, manner, and place restrictions on
speech need only meet the rational relations test of reasonableness.""
Hunting and fishing areas (national forests and other public lands),
like the school mailboxes in Perry, or the post office sidewalks in
Kokinda, meet the nontraditional/nondedicated public forum criteria.
This is because hunting and fishing areas are not traditional or dedicated public forums for public opinion purposes, nor have they been
opened up to such. Therefore, restrictions on speech in the forum
need only bear a rational relation to the State's purposes in enacting
the law. As in Kokinda, the government may reserve a nontraditional/
nondedicated public forum for its intended purposes (in the case of
hunt interference statutes, hunting and fishing, which would seem to
be intended "wildlife and fish purposes") as long as the regulation of
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress speech because of
its content.' 95 Having shown that the hunt interference statute meets
the higher burden of mid-level analysis, the above mentioned governmental interests (i.e., game management, public safety, public fiscal
policy, etc.) easily meet the Kokinda burden of bearing a rational relation to reasonable governmental interests.
CONCLUSION

If the Wyoming hunt interference statute was challenged for
vagueness and overbreadth, the outcome is predictable. As shown by
above analysis, the Wyoming statute meets the standards set by
Grayned. The hunt interference statute avoids vagueness problems by
placing the ordinary person on notice that certain activity is prohibited. The activity prohibited by the Wyoming statute is intentional
interference with the lawful taking of game. The statute avoids arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of its provisions by using explicit terms which leave little room for error. Otherwise vague terms
are either defined within the hunt interference statute or defined
within the Game and Fish section. The Wyoming statute avoids
problems of overbreadth because it does not outlaw otherwise constitutional activity. Such problems are avoided because the statute confines its limitations on disruptive expression to specific instances of
time, manner, and place. The hunt interference statute limits its restrictions to a specific time defined in the statute, during the lawful
taking process. It describes the manner of activity prohibited: conduct
intended to interfere with, by preventing or hindering, the taking process. The place of the restriction is the place where game is lawfully
taken, usually public hunting and fishing areas. The statute does not
194. Compare Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121, to textual assertion. If the Kokinda
Court could classify post office sidewalks as a nontraditional public forum, it would
certainly be reasonable to classify public hunting and fishing areas as such.
195. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121-22; see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
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prohibit otherwise nondisruptive activities.
If the Wyoming hunt interference statute was challenged on a
theory that it quashes free speech in a traditional or nontraditional
(but opened or dedicated for public opinion purposes) forum, the conclusion is also predictable. The statute does not discriminate based
upon a person's viewpoint or the content of speech. Thus, the conclusion that it is a content-neutral regulation is unavoidable. Applying
the appropriate mid-level scrutiny, the hunt interference statute
passes constitutional muster. It does so because its regulations are
content-neutral, the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve substantial governmental interests, and it leaves open alternative channels of
communication.
Even more probable is that the forum the Wyoming statute seeks
to regulate is a nontraditional public forum not dedicated or specifically opened for public debate purposes. Perry holds that government
regulations of speech that are content-neutral in this type of forum
are subject to the lowest standard of scrutiny, rational relations. Analysis showed that the Wyoming statute's regulations bore a rational
relation to governmental purposes and that the statute was reasonably
tailored, in light of the forum's normal activity, to achieve those
interests.
The Wyoming hunt interference statute is therefore constitutional. As Justice Harlan said in Konigsberg, the First Amendment
does not allow the unfettered exercise of speech nor unregulated talkativeness. Nor does it give us the unlimited right to impose our personal beliefs and agendas on others to the extent that it interferes
with their participation and enjoyment of a lawful activity. That is
called anarchy. In the case of animal rights activists' interference with
lawful hunting and fishing activities, it is "anarchy in the woods."
SEAN PETERSON DURRANT
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